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Machine learning has become rapidly utilized in cybersecurity, rising from almost non-existent to currently 
over half of cybersecurity techniques utilized commercially. Machine learning is advancing at a rapid rate, 
and the application of new learning techniques to cybersecurity have not been investigate yet. Current 
technology trends have led to an abundance of household items containing microprocessors all connected 
within a private network. Thus, network intrusion detection is essential for keeping these networks secure. 
However, network intrusion detection can be extremely taxing on battery operated devices. The presented 
work presents a cyberattack detection system based on a multilayer perceptron neural network algorithm. 
To show that this system can operate at low power, the algorithm was executed on two commercially 
available minicomputer systems including the Raspberry PI 3 and the Asus Tinkerboard. An analysis of 
accuracy, power, energy, and timing was performed to study the tradeoffs necessary when executing these 
algorithms at low power. Our results show that these low power implementations are feasible, and a scan 
rate of more than 226,000 packets per second can be achieved from a system that requires approximately 
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Computer networks have steadily increased in size and complexity since their 
inception. As computer networks grow, it becomes more difficult to provide reliable 
network security [1], especially in low power portable systems. In current commercial 
technology, many electronic devices and systems possess both a microprocessor and a 
connection to a network. Unless each of these devices are equipped with up to date 
network security, users are exposing their networks to a substantial number of access 
points. Therefore, high speed energy efficient intrusion detection must be utilized to 
protect systems from the rapidly evolving cyberattack landscape. 
Intrusion detection systems that use neural networks and machine learning can be 
utilized as an efficient alternative to traditional security systems. Neural networks are 
extremely capable in the fields of image and pattern recognition [2,3]. These capabilities 
can be leveraged in intrusion detection applications as the networks are trained to 
recognize the difference between benign data and a cyberattack. Certain neural network 
algorithms have adaptive properties [4], thus they can self-optimize during normal 
operation. The ability to improve during while in use would be useful in an intrusion 
detection system because new cyberattacks are constantly being developed. Therefore, it 
would be possible for an adaptive system to catch new attacks without undergoing a 
costly retraining process. Many neural network algorithms are implemented using layers 
of vector-matrix multiplication [5]. This type of algorithm can be implemented in an 
extremely parallel design using specialized low power hardware [5-10]. Thus, neural 
network based intrusion detection could be performed at extreme low power. 
Before low power, energy efficient machine learning based intrusion detection 
systems are produced, different learning algorithms need to be examined to determine 
which are most appropriate for recognizing attacks within network data. Thus, this work 
presents a comparison of two perceptron topologies running on two different low power 
hardware systems. For training and testing this work uses the NSL-KDD dataset [11], an 
update to the Knowledge Discovery and Datamining dataset [12]. In this work we train 
two different multilayer perceptron algorithms, one with a single hidden layer, and one 
with two hidden layers. In addition to studying perceptron algorithm accuracy [1], in this 
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work we study low power implementations of these algorithms on a Raspberry Pi 3 [13] 
and an Asus Tinkerboard [14]. These minicomputers are low power (<6W), handheld 
(<60g) computing systems with a high degree of flexibility. Our results present a design 
space analysis that discusses the tradeoff of using these systems in terms of accuracy, 
power, energy, and time. By using these systems, we show that network intrusion 
detection can be implemented on lower power systems with greater than 99% accuracy 
with a scanning rate of more than 226,000 packets / second. 
Related work in this area shows similar studies where neural network algorithms 
are used to carry out intrusion detection using similar training and testing datasets. Both 
convolutional [15] and deep learning [16] architectures have been applied to this 
problem, and these approaches achieve high accuracy, which is about 99% in some cases. 
Hebbian learning has also been applied to the cyber-attack detection problem, and 
significant detection improvement is observed when using a multiscale learning rule [17]. 
In our previous work, we compare perceptron algorithms that differ in size and 
complexity in terms of attack detection accuracy [18]. Furthermore, our research group 
has studied the implementation of network intrusion detection on more exotic hardware 
architectures including the IBM True North spiking processor [19], as well as simulated 
memristor hardware [20]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no published work has 
carried out a power, energy, and timing comparison when moving these algorithms to 
low size, weight, and power commercial off the shelf systems. The presented work 
demonstrates the possibility efficiently implementing intrusion detection using low cost 
components. 
This work is organized as follows: Section II details the necessary background to 
understand the objectives of this work, Section III describes neural network algorithms, 
Section IV discusses the perceptron algorithms used in this work, and Section V 
describes the NSL-KDD dataset used in this work. Section VI shows the results obtained 
when training and testing one of the network topologies using MATLAB. Section VII 
discusses the results found when training and testing the network topologies using 
TensorFlow and low power hardware. Section VIII discusses the hardware evaluation 
results that compare these networks in terms of power, energy, and time. Finally, Section 
IX provides a brief conclusion. 




Prior to implementing neural network layouts on a working knowledge of 
machine learning, neural networks, and intrusion detection was developed. Traditional 
network intrusion detection systems are general rule based (such as Snort). Because 
traditional systems follow rules based on attacks that were previously determined to be 
malicious, they are generally unable to recognize new attacks. New malicious attacks are 
continuously created. Given the goal of our work is to develop a low power efficient 
intrusion detection system, the traditional system would not be the most effective given 
that it generally is not good at recognized new attacks. Therefore, our approach to 
network intrusion detection is a neural network pattern based system that can potentially 
recognize patterns among malicious attacks in order to identify them.  
Neural networks have various practical applications including facial recognition, 
voice recognition, and medical image recognition. Ultimately, the task was to develop 
low power machine learning algorithms that can serve as efficient intrusion detection 
systems given the power constants of low power systems. In order to develop the low 
power intrusion detection system, we studied neural networks to determine which were 
the most promising for detecting cyberattacks, we tested the neural networks for 
efficiency using a portable computer, we then tested the neural networks for efficiency 
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Neural Network Algorithms
Before determining which neural network algorithm to implement and test on low 
power systems, a survey of previous studies using neural networks was completed. Table 
I displays the previous work using neural networks for cyberattack detection and the 
corresponding accuracies as reported in the studies. As shown in Table I, Multilayer 
Perceptron Algorithms consistently have accuracies higher than 99% [15, 17, 18, 19]. 
Table I. Accuracies for Various Neural Networks Studied in Previous Work. 
 Network Algorithm Accuracy (%) 
Multiscale Hebbian 93.56 
Deep Convolutional Network 98.83 
Multilayer Perceptron – 1 hidden layer 99.85 
Multilayer Perceptron – 2 hidden layers 99.68 
Multilayer Perceptron – 3 hidden layers 99.78 
Convolutional Neural Network – 1 layer 99.9 
Convolutional Neural Network – 2 layers 99.8 
Convolutional Neural Network – 3 layers 80.1 
Deep Feed Forward – 1 layer 92.9 
Deep Feed Forward – 2 layers 92.9 
Deep Feed Forward – 3 layers 93.0 
Deep Feed Forward – 4 layers 93.0 
Deep Feed Forward – 5 layers 92.9 
Key differences between the work depicted in Table 1 and the work that we have 
done is that we will be testing the algorithms using low power systems.  
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Perceptron Learning Algorithms 
A neural network is a computing system inspired by human brain function. Neural 
networks “learn” to complete tasks by recognizing patterns rather than following a set of 
rules.  They generally operate in two stages: training and testing. During the training 
stage, the system is shown data which it then classifies. After the network makes a 
classification determination, an error calculation is determined. Depending on how 
accurate the system’s classifications were, weights will be updated accordingly. This 
process will continue in stages until the system processes the data for a predetermined 
number of stages. Once the process is complete the weights remain unchanged and the 
system moves on to the testing stage. During the testing stage, the system is again shown 
data to classify. After each data packet is classified, a final accuracy is determined. This 
type of system could allow for real-time updates and feedback and could also prevent 




















































































Figure 1. Two different multilayer perceptron topologies presented in this work including (a) a topology with one hidden layer 
and (b) a topology with two hidden layers. 
After surveying various types of neural network algorithms and other network 
intrusion detection studies [19], the multilayer perceptron was determined to be the first 
neural network type to examine on both a computer system and low power hardware. 
Two layouts of the multilayer perceptron were tests, one with a single hidden layer and 
one with two hidden layers (see Fig. 1). Perceptron algorithms possess two different 
modes of operation, as discussed above, testing and training. During the training phase, 
an iterative algorithm updates the weights w with the goal of minimizing error over time. 
Once training is finished, the resulting network should provide strong classification 
accuracy when presented with data like the training data. In this work, we utilize the 
standard back-propagation training algorithm [22]. Corresponding to Fig. 1, the 
intermediate output… 
The multilayer perceptron in Figure 1 (a) contains one layer of neurons between 
weight matrices wa and wb. The input pattern must traverse each of these layers before a 
classification result is produced. Increasing the number of neurons layers in a perceptron 
typically produces a system with a higher classification accuracy. With more layers, more 
complex distinctions can be made as flexibility in feature classification is increased. Fig. 
1 (b) shows multilayer perceptron with two hidden neuron layers. In the following 
section, we analyze the differences between these two network layouts in terms of 
accuracy, energy, and timing.  




To train and evaluate the intrusion detection networks, we make use of an 
improvement to the Knowledge Discovery and Datamining (KDD) data set which is 
known to make the data more appropriate for examining the effectiveness of artificial 
neural networks. This dataset is known as NSL-KDD [11]. NSL-KDD removes all 
repeated identical data points from the KDD dataset [12] and provides more balance to 
the different classes within the data.  
More specifically, for the experiments in this work, the entirety of the data found 
in the “KDDtrain+.txt” file was used and can be found at [11]. This dataset contains 
several different types of cyberattacks and are detailed in Table II. Twenty-two different 
attacks are present in this data, and a large amount of benign data is also present in this 
data, and a large amount of benign data is also present. The systems presented in this 
work must learn to distinguish between the normal data and the attack data with the 
highest accuracy possible.  
The differences between a normal packed (see Figure 2 (a)) and an attack packet 
(see Figure 2 (b)) in the NSL-KDD dataset are not easily recognizable, but patterns in the 
features are likely to emerge when scanning a large number of samples. To take 
advantage of each of the features in this data during training and classification, some 
minor preprocessing was performed. Each packet contains 43 values, and the 42nd value 
(displayed as either normal or Neptune in Figure 2) was sued as a label during training. 
The 43rd entry is a number related to classification difficulty which was removed and not 
used in this experiment. Additionally, the twentieth entry has a value of 0 for all packets 
in the dataset, so this value was removed from all packets since it would not affect 
training accuracy. The features (displayed as tcp, http, and SF in Figure 2 (a)) were non-
numerical, so they were converted to integer values. For example, the fourth feature from 
the left 9SF in Figure 2 (a)) is a label capable of storing one of eleven possible strings, 
thus the string contained in this feature is now represented by a number 1 through 11 
(depending on the string present). The data was also normalized (across samples) so that 
the largest value in any feature column was 1. Figure 3 shows the same example packets 
in Figure 2 after processing has been applied.  
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back 956 DOS 
buffer_overflow 30 U2R 
ftp_write 8 R2L 
guess_passwd 53 R2L 
imap 11 R2L 
ipsweep 3599 PROBE 
land 18 DOS 
loadmodule 9 U2R 
multihop 7 R2L 
neptune 41214 DOS 
nmap 1493 PROBE 
normal 67343 NORMAL 
perl 3 U2R 
phf 4 R2L 
pod 201 DOS 
portsweep 2931 PROBE 
rootkit 10 U2R 
satan 3633 PROBE 
smurf 2646 DOS 
spy 2 R2L 
teardrop 892 DOS 
warezclient 890 R2L 


















Figure 2. Examples of packets contained in the NSL-KDD dataset displaying (a) a normal packet, and (b) an attack. 
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MATLAB Software Results 
Prior to testing the chosen Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) algorithms for efficiency 
on low power systems, the MLP algorithm with two hidden layers was analyzed using 
MATLAB. Figure 4 shows the error minimization over several iterations of training. The y-
axis is root mean squared error and the x-axis shows iterations of training. As shown in 
the figure, as training progresses, error decreases.  
 
Figure 4. Root mean squared error minimization curve for training of multilayer perceptron 
algorithm with two hidden layers using MATLAB. 
 
 Following training, testing was completed. Table III shows the accuracy for 
various training data sizes and iterations of training. This chart shows that as the training 
data set size increases and as the number of iterations increases, accuracy generally 







P a g e  | 11 
 
 
Table III. Accuracies during testing of multilayer perceptron algorithm with two hidden layers using 
MATLAB. 
 Iterations Training Data Set Size 
  1000 5000 10000 50000 100000 145586 
2 60.33 96.86 97.42 98.18 98.64 98.85 
5 60.33 97.32 97.6 98.63 98.78 99.18 
10 91.74 97.59 98.33 99.01 99.58 99.7 
20 97.22 98.42 98.67 99 99.6 99.67 
30 97.39 98.53 98.82 99.01 99.68 99.73 
50 97.4 98.49 98.36 99.66 99.71 99.76 
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TensorFlow Software Results   
Training 
Table IV displays the two different perceptron topologies that were examined in 
this work. In each case, the network was trained for 100 epochs and the root mean 
squared error minimization curves are displayed in Figure 5.  
Table IV. Different Multilayer Perceptron Topologies Used in this Work.  
Network Type Network Layout 
MLP with 2 Hidden Layers 40→14→9→2 








Figure. 5. Plots displaying training error over the 100 training iterations for a MLP with (a) two hidden layers using 100% of 
the data for training, (b) a single hidden layer using 100% of the data for training, (c) two hidden layers and 50% of the data 
for training, and (d) one hidden layer and 50% of the data for training. 
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The input layer had 40 entries in each case, because this is the number values that 
each data example contained after pre-processing the NSL-KDD dataset. Each of the 
MLP networks in Table IV were trained using two different data arrangements. 
First, to directly study the networks’ ability to train, all 125,973 packets in the 
dataset were used for training (see Figures 5 (a) and (b)). This same dataset is then used 
for testing. In the second data arrangement 50% of the packets were used for training and 
the other 50% were used for testing (see Figures 5(c) and (d)). This will test the networks 
ability to predict, as they will be tested on data that was not used during training. In each 
case in Figure 5, training correctly shows error minimization as the number of training 
epochs increases.  
 
Testing and Evaluation 
To judge each network layout in terms of how it can detect cyberattacks once 
training is complete, this section discusses testing accuracy. Tables V and VI show the 
testing results, and in each case these results represent an average of five identical 
training and testing executions. This provides a fairer measure as it accounts for the 
variation in the system, as weights will optimize differently with each run. Furthermore, 
in the case where 50% of the data was used for training, this 50% is randomly selected, 
and the testing and training datasets will differ for each run.  
For the case where 100% of the data was used for training, that same data set was 
applied to each of the network configurations for testing and these results are displayed in 
Table V. When comparing the two different MLP layouts, the total accuracy is nearly 
identical. When looking at the classification breakdown in Table V, it appears that the 
system with one hidden layer is better at classifying attacks, and the system with two 
hidden layers has fewer false positives.  
When comparing the data in Table V to that in Table VI, accuracy falls slightly 
when prediction is required to determine packet type, and this is to be expected. Again, 
the difference in accuracy between the MLP with one hidden layer and the MLP with two 
hidden layers is very small.  
 
P a g e  | 14 
 
 
Table V. Classification Accuracy when Using 100% of the Data for Training. 
ANN Type Accuracy Hits Correct Rejections Misses False Positives 
Single Hidden Layer 99.458% 58226.6 67064.4 403.4 278.6 
Two Hidden Layers 99.441% 58119.6 67111.8 510.4 231.2 
 
 
Table VI. Classification Accuracy when Using 50% of the Data for Training. 
ANN Type Accuracy Hits Correct Rejections Misses False Positives 
Single Hidden Layer 99.190% 28828.6 33647.4 261.4 248.6 
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Low Power Hardware Results 
After the accuracy was analyzed for these networks, they were ported to two 
different minicomputer systems, the Raspberry PI 3 [13], and the Asus Tinkerboard [14]. 
Photos of each of these systems are displayed in Figure 6. The following subsections 
describe power, energy, and time analysis of these systems when executing the presented 





Figure 6. Photographs of (a) the Raspberry PI 3 and (b) the Asus Tinkerboard. 
 
 




For each of the test cases described in Tables V and VI, the MLP networks were 
executed in Python scripts on each of these systems while a ‘watts up? PRO’ power 
analyzer logged power consumption at regular intervals during runtime. Figure 7 shows 
power consumption for each minicomputer when using the MLP with two hidden layers 




Training Starts Training Stops
 
Figure 7. Power consumption during training when executing the MLP with 2 hidden layers on (a) 
the Raspberry PI and (b) the Tinkerboard (20 epoch training interval). 
 
Likewise, Figure 7 shows the power consumption of each system when in 
network packet evaluation mode. To generate a result with a higher resolution time 
interval, the system was tested using the entire dataset 100 times.  
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Similar results were obtained for each of the MLP cases and were used to 
generate the analysis presented in the following tables. As in Table VII, we can subtract 
the idle power present in each system to determine the dynamic power requirement when 
executing these MLP scripts. Static Power was determined measuring each system’s idle 
power for 300 seconds. The values and trends generated when testing these networks (as 
opposed to training them) are very similar so that data is not displayed. The differences 
between these systems in terms of energy is the more provocative result. Thus, the energy 
analysis of these systems is presented in Tables VIII through X.  
 
Table VII. Power Consumption for Each of the MLP Systems During Training. 
Power Measurement Raspberry PI Tinkerboard 
Idle Power 1.7429 W 2.7337 W 
Dynamic Power One Hidden Layer 0.9571 W 2.1292 W 
Total Power One Hidden Layer 2.7004 W 4.8629 W 
Dynamic Power Two Hidden Layers 1.1428 W 2.2366 W 
Total Power Two Hidden Layers 2.8857 W 4.9703 W 
 
Energy Analysis 
Using the power consumption and runtime data collected during execution, 
energy consumption can also be determined for each of the MLP cases. Table VIII shows 
energy consumption for an entire training epoch for each case, where HL denotes the 
number of hidden layers in the network. Note that even though the Tinkerboard requires 
slightly higher power, its energy consumption is lower due to its higher execution speed. 
Table IX and X consider the per packet energy for training and testing respectively. The 
energy per packet is essentially the same for each MLP architecture whether 50% or 
100% of the data is used for training because the networks are identical in each case. Due 
to the complexity of the training algorithm, an energy increase of nearly two orders of 
magnitude is present for a single packet when compared to testing.  
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Table VIII. Energy Per Training Epoch for Each of the Computing Systems Executing Each of the 
Four MLP Cases.  
 Computing System 
Network Raspberry PI Tinkerboard 
2HL 100% 316.759 J 278.983 J 
2HL 50% 143.200 J 137.325 J 
1HL 100% 191.099 J 191.319 J 
1HL 50% 100.443 J 96.655 J 
 
 
Table IX. Energy Per Packet During Training for Each of the Computing Systems Executing Each of 
the Four MLP Cases. 
 Computing System 
Network Raspberry PI Tinkerboard 
2HL 100% 2.514 mJ 2.215 mJ 
2HL 50% 2.274 mJ 2.180 mJ 
1HL 100% 1.517 mJ 1.519 mJ 
1HL 50% 1.595 mJ 1.535 mJ 
 
 
Table X. Energy Per Packet During Testing for Each of the Computing Systems Executing Each of 
the Four MLP Cases.  
 Computing System 
Network Raspberry PI Tinkerboard 
2HL 100% 37.494 µJ 29.738 µJ 
2HL 50% 36.054 µJ 27.785 µJ 
1HL 100% 28.402 µJ 22.990 µJ 








Lastly, computation time per packet was examined for each of the MLP cases. 
These values correlate closely to the energy numbers for each of the minicomputer 
systems. However, timing data was also collected for a notebook computer running 64-bit 
Windows 10 Pro with an Intel Core i7-6700HQ CPU @ 2.6 GHz with 16 GB RAM to 
provide a baseline time value. In the future, we will also determine a fair way to measure 
energy consumption for traditional full sized computing systems.  
 When comparing Tables XI and XII, a consistent speedup of two orders of 
magnitude is observed when testing as opposed to training. This correlates to the energy 
values presented as well. To determine the speedup gained from a higher power system, a 
summary is presented in Table XIII. Each of the minicomputers are significantly slower 
than the Core i7 system. Thus, a user’s hardware selection may be based on expected data 
throughput in addition to power requirements. For example, one of the low power 
systems could be more appropriate for a communication network that is used less 
frequently. The significant time and energy increases when moving from an MLP with a 
single hidden layer to one with two hidden layers should also be considered. These two 
systems did not provide a statistically significant difference in accuracy, but a 30% 
increase in cost (considering time and energy during testing) is required to add a second 
hidden layer to these networks.  
 
Table XI. Execution Time Per Packet During Training for Each of the Computing Systems Executing 
Each of the Four MLP Cases. 
 Computing System 
Network Raspberry PI Tinkerboard Core i7 
2HL 100% 871.365 µs 445.571 µs 69.389 µs 
2HL 50% 854.989 µs 450.356 µs 69.143 µs 
1HL 100% 561.846 µs 312.310 µs 49.678 µs 
1HL 50% 600.609 µs 314.719 µs 50.689 µs 
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Table XII. Execution Time Per Packet During Testing for Each of the Computing Systems Executing 
Each of the Four MLP Cases. 
 Computing System 
Network Raspberry PI Tinkerboard Core i7 
2HL 100% 14.564 µs 6.063 µs 0.817 µs 
2HL 50% 14.422 µs 6.157 µs 0.690 µs 
1HL 100% 11.067 µs 4.459 µs 0.798 µs 
1HL 50% 11.004 µs 4.413 µs 0.600 µs 
 
Table XIII. Time Factors Showing How Much Speedup is Obtained for Each System When in a 
Testing Mode. 
 Computing System 
Network Raspberry PI Tinkerboard Core i7 
2HL 17.83× 7.42× 1× 

















This work examines operation of a perceptron based intrusion detection system 
implemented on low power hardware. A power, energy, timing, and accuracy design 
space analysis was performed to quantify the benefits of portable low power intrusion 
detection. Greater than 99% accuracy is achieved using the proposed multilayer 
perceptron algorithm. Using low power hardware, a scan rate of greater than 226,000 
packets per second can be achieved while consuming less than 5 Watts of power.  
We have several ideas for future work including a more complete power analysis 
that includes optimized desktop hardware. We would like to further examine the 
relationship between network complexity and accuracy for network intrusion detection in 
order to develop a relationship between network power consumption and accuracy. We 
would also like to implement alternative neural network algorithms that may be more 
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